This dissertation presents an interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logioo-Philosophicus. Part One, i.e. chapters 2-16, deals with the Tractatus' view of drawing a limit to thinking, while Part Two, i.e. chapters 17-20, with its view of philosophy and ethics (value). Chapters 2-5 explain Wittgenstein's view of thinking and language. Chapters 6-10 argue that, for him, the internal rules of language are determined by the forms of symbols, and vice versa. Chapters 11-15 explain his view that logic is the logic of language. A major conclusion of Part One is then this: For him, a limit can be drawn to thinking by establishing a symbolism whose signs show the forms of its symbols. Chapter 17 argues that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy is an activity which demonstrates the senselessness of philosophical propositions by pointing out the referencelessness of some of their constituent symbols. Since pointing out the referencelessness of a symbol requires that the form of the symbol can be recognized merely from its sign, the possibility of performing philosophy depends on the possibility of drawing a limit to thinking. For Wittgenstein, an expression like 'The world (as a whole) exists' is senseless because the constituent symbol 'The world' cannot be given a reference. For in order for 'The world' to signify the world as a whole, its form must characterize the world as a whole and thus nothing specific. So the symbol can signify nothing. Rather, its form, as a characterization of the world as a whole, already shows what it attempts to signify. The demonstration of philosophy then brings out what cannot be said but can only be shown what the forgotten original wonder at the world (as a whole) is about. Chapter 18 explains how Wittgenstein tries to bring out the self as the willing self by demonstrating the senselessness of solipsism. Chapter 19 argues that, for him, the will's seeing the world as a whole is seeing the world with a value; and explains how he tries to bring out value by demonstrating the senselessness of propositions about the consequences of ethical acts. But we argue that his demonstrations in both cases are not successful. For, instead of tying up the voluntary aspect of the self with the relevant philosophical confusions, he merely appeals to the problematic notion of a complex to ensure the voluntary aspect of the self.