This paper examines the potential contribution of unemployment hysteresis theories to the understanding of the Belgian labor market. It estimates models of wage determination using aggregate and firm-level panel data. Two main conclusions emerge: (i) the long-term unemployed do not exert a negative impact on wages; and (ii) there is some evidence that the incumbent workers, the quot;insiders,quot; exercise market power in wage determination, taking greater account of their own interests than those of the unemployed quot;outsiders.quot; In addition, it is argued that the automatic indexation of wages to prices in Belgium can cause a downward rigidity in real wages, given the multi-tier real wage bargaining process. Recent initiatives, including the introduction of a competitiveness norm for indexation, and labor market programs aimed at the long-term unemployed and the young, such as the plan d`accompagnement and the plan d`embauche des jeunes, are appropriate in view of the existence of insider power in wage determination.