This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1919 edition. Excerpt: ... CHAPTER XIII THE ATTACK ON THE DUJAILA REDOUBT The attack on March 8th on the Sinn position on the right bank was perhaps the most criticised action in the advance. The scheme was to carry the Dujaila Redoubt, the key of the whole position, and thence to pivot round in the enemy's rear and cut off his communications, thus making the right bank untenable. It was hoped that this manoeuvre would compel the Turks to evacuate the north bank, leaving us the command of the river and an open door to Kut. We put into the field for these operations the 3rd Division and three Brigades, the 28th, 35th, and 36th, in all some 20,000 men, including cavalry, sappers, and pioneers. The Turkish force on the right bank between the Shatt-el-Hai and our position was estimated at 10,000, not including the reserves that could be brought up from Shumran or ferried across the Tigris at Magasis. The total force at their command between Baghdad and the firing line was estimated at 35,000. A bolder, though ultimately less ambitious, scheme would have been, instead of attacking the Sinn position, to march straight on Kut and extricate Townshend and his garrison so that they could have joined camps with Aylmer at a point in advance of Orah, leaving the Turk the empty prize of Kut, and the command for the time being of this stretch of the river. Experience had taught us that the cost of these frontal attacks, even when successful, is prohibitive. We had not recovered from the wastage of January 7th, 12th, and 21st; and to waste ourselves again with reinforcements in sight seemed like the act of a man with a broken limb who takes his splints off a day or two before the bone has united. The essential thing was to concentrate our forces for one blow, not to fritter them...