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| Author | : Helen Liu |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 184 |
| Release | : 2010 |
| Genre | : Audit committees |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Nelson Milan Carrasco Abarca |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 92 |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : Audit committees |
| ISBN | : |
In a recent concept release the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) highlighted concerns regarding auditor independence and auditor objectivity. They expressed concern that auditors may have a bias to accept management's views, particularly in long auditor tenure relations, and asked for public comments on the idea of mandatory auditor rotation. Prior research has focused primarily on the auditor side of the relation, however, my study considers the collaborative effect of the three parties involved in the financial reporting process (management (Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the auditor, and the audit committee). I find that longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and the auditor is associated with lower positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management). This finding is contrary to the PCAOB's concerns regarding long auditor tenure and lower financial reporting quality. I do not find that the joint tenure of the three parties (CEO, auditor and audit committee chair) is significantly associated with earnings management or accrual quality. I also find that the first year of an audit committee chair change is associated with an increase in positive discretionary accruals. This association does not differ based on different lengths of auditor tenure. However, longer collaborative tenure between the auditor and the CEO constrains earnings management and there is an even greater effect when there is an audit committee chair change (i.e., there are lower positive discretionary accruals). This study provides evidence that longer auditor tenure is not necessarily an undesirable situation, either by itself and particularly not if the long tenure is coupled with long tenure of the CEO.
| Author | : Vineeta Divesh Sharma |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2006 |
| Genre | : Corporations |
| ISBN | : |
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to reform the corporate governance mechanisms in order to improve the quality of financial reporting and thus, enhance the confidence of investors in the stock market and in the accounting profession. Despite the efforts of the SEC, financial reporting scandals continue with record numbers of financial restatements documented by the General Accounting Office. A financial restatement is a correction of a previously misstated financial statement. There is a small volume of literature examining the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financial restatements. The results of these studies however, are mixed and possibly explained by their narrow focus and omitted variables that could influence the effectiveness of audit committees. Consequently, this study examines the effects of independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence on financial restatements. Specifically, this study investigates the relationship between the likelihood of financial restatements and: (1) the expertise of the independent audit committee members, (2) the expertise and diligence of the independent audit committee members, (3) the reputation of the independent audit committee members, (4) the interaction effect of expertise, diligence and reputation, (5) the tenure of the independent audit committee members, and (6) the cash compensation paid to independent audit committee members. Prior studies have not investigated some of these variables or the interaction effects of independent audit committee member characteristics on financial restatements. This study also investigates the association between auditor independence and financial restatements. The SEC alleges that an increasing number of audit failures are due to the lack of auditor independence. One of the major sources of the lack of auditor independence is the auditor's economic dependency on the client. The provision of non-audit services increases the financial reliance of the auditor on the client. As a result, the auditor may become reluctant to raise issues with the preparation of the financial statements at the risk of foregoing the lucrative non-audit services fees. The SEC believes that longer audit firm tenure can also impair auditor independence and Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests periodic audit firm rotation. Therefore, auditor independence was measured as: (1) fees paid to the auditor, and (2) audit firm tenure. Finally, this study extends the prior literature by studying the interaction effects of independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence on financial restatements. This interaction effect is important because the external auditor and the audit committee are regarded vital governance mechanisms that interact and exchange dialogue in the performance of their respective oversight of the financial reporting process. Prior research has not investigated this important interaction effect. The sample of the study comprises 69 U.S. publicly listed companies that announced their restatement from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2002. These companies were matched with 69 non-restatement companies based on industry and size. The data for the study is derived from SEC filings such as Form 10-K and DEF 14A, and Compustat. The univariate results show that compared to restatement firms, non-restatement firms generally have effective audit committee characteristics. The audit committees of non-restatement firms have members who are experts, diligent, reputable and appropriately compensated. They also pay lower non-audit services and total fees, and have audit firms with longer tenure. The multivariate results show that after controlling for other governance structures and firm specific non-governance variables, the likelihood of financial restatements is related to independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence. Specifically, the likelihood of financial restatements decreases when independent audit committee members are: (1) experts, (2) experts and diligent, (3) reputable, (4) experts, diligent and reputable, and (5) appropriately compensated. The audit committee member tenure variable is insignificant. In relation to the auditor independence variables, the multivariate results show that the likelihood of financial restatements increases when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher. On the other hand, the likelihood of financial restatements decreases when audit firm tenure is longer. The empirical results of this study suggest that independent audit committees are more effective overseers of the corporate financial reporting and auditing processes when: they comprise majority experts, they meet regularly, their members are reputable, and audit committee members are appropriately compensated. On the other hand, external auditors are not deemed to be effective overseers of the corporate financial reporting process when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher but are effective when audit firm tenure is long. The results support the SEC's concerns regarding the provision of non-audit services impairing auditor independence. The results also support the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which under Section 201 prohibits external auditors from providing certain non-audit services to its audit client. Overall, these results support the regulatory efforts to increase the quality of financial reporting by enhancing the corporate governance process related to audit committees and auditor independence. However, the results do not support calls to limit the tenure of the auditor. The results of the multivariate interaction effects suggest that, after controlling for other governance structures and firm specific non-governance variables, when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher, the likelihood of financial restatements increases under conditions when the audit committee is not effective (a non expert audit committee, an audit committee that does not meet regularly, an audit committee whose members are not reputable or an audit committee that is not appropriately compensated). The implication of this result is that it provides evidence of conditions under which restatements take place. Knowledge of such conditions could aid regulators further improve the financial reporting process and corporate governance. This knowledge will support regulators in revising policies that ensure audit committee members are not only independent but also comprise other critical qualities. These improvements to the audit committee coupled with the existing regulations on the provision of non-audit services suggest a company's governance will be more effective. Overall, the results extend current knowledge in the sparse but growing literature related to financial restatements and corporate governance, and extend our understanding of the effectiveness and interaction of governance mechanisms in reducing financial restatements.
| Author | : Marshall A. Geiger |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 160 |
| Release | : 2021-06-09 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1000392031 |
Auditor reporting on going-concern-related uncertainties remains one of the most challenging issues faced by external auditors. Business owners, market participants and audit regulators want an early warning of impending business failure. However, companies typically do not welcome audit opinions indicating uncertainty regarding their future viability. Thus, the auditor’s decision to issue a "going concern opinion" (GCO) is a complex and multi-layered one, facing a great deal of tension. Given such a rich context, academic researchers have examined many facets related to an auditor’s decision to issue a GCO. This monograph reviews and synthesizes 182 recent GCO studies that have appeared since the last significant review published in 2013 through the end of 2019. The authors categorize studies into the three broad areas of GCO: (1) determinants, (2) accuracy and (3) consequences. As an integral part of their synthesis, they summarize the details of each study in several user-friendly tables. After discussing and synthesizing the research, they present a discussion of opportunities for future research, including issues created or exacerbated as a result of the global COVID-19 pandemic. This monograph will be of assistance to researchers interested in exploring this area of auditor responsibility. It will also be of interest to auditing firms and individual practitioners wanting to learn what academic research has examined and found regarding this challenging aspect of audit practice. Auditing standard-setters and regulators will find it of interest as the authors review numerous studies examining issues related to audit policy and regulation, and their effects on GCO decisions. The examination of GCO research is extremely timely given the financial and business disruption caused by the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic. This unprecedented global event has caused companies, auditors and professional bodies to revisit and reassess their approach to going concern, and to think even more deeply about this fundamental business imperative.
| Author | : Krish Bhaskar |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 144 |
| Release | : 2019-04-16 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1000007863 |
Focussing on the dominance of the Big Four auditing firms – PwC, EY, Deloitte and KPMG – this concise volume provides an authoritative critical assessment of the state and future of the audit market, currently the subject of much debate and the focus of significant government enquiries. Drawing on extensive research and a vast collection of evidence from interviews with insiders, experts and users, it explores the key issues of audit quality, independence, choice and the growing expectation gap. Just as disruptive technologies are overturning other established sectors, this book explores their impact on accounting, financial reporting and auditing. It questions whether the Big Four-dominated audit market is prepared not only for the inevitable disruption of new technologies, but also the challenges of negative public perceptions, cynicism about regulation and demands for greater transparency. In the context of increasing high-profile corporate failures, this book provides a compelling scrutiny of the industry’s failings and present difficulties, and the impact of future disruption. At this crucial time, it will be of great interest to students, researchers and professionals in accounting and auditing, as well as policy makers and regulators.
| Author | : Ferdinand A. Gul |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 43 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This study examines whether the impact of non-audit fees on auditor independence is contingent on auditor tenure. The results, based on a sample of 4,720 U.S. firms for the years 2000 and 2001, show that there is a positive association between non-audit fees and positive discretionary current accruals, a proxy for auditor independence, for firms with short auditor tenure of not more than three years. These findings suggest that non-audit fees may impair auditor independence when auditor tenure is short and not when auditor tenure is long. Furthermore, exploratory analyses show that the positive association between non-audit fees and earnings management for firms with short auditor tenure is significant for small clients but not for large clients. Taken together, these results suggest that the association between non-audit fees and auditor independence is contingent upon auditor tenure, and that high non-audit fees have a negative impact on auditor independence when audit tenure is short and client firm size is small.
| Author | : Chaudhry Ghafran |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This thesis examines the impact of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality in the context of a large sample of UK companies over the period 2007-2010. The notion of financial reporting quality is assessed by looking at the audit quality and earnings quality of the firms. This study utilises the audit fee and non-audit fee ratio as its proxies for audit quality and accruals based earnings management models as its proxies for earnings quality. The findings from the multivariate analysis show that audit committee meetings and financial expertise exert a significant positive impact on audit fees. Investigating expertise further, this study finds no support for the notion that accounting expertise influences audit fees, however a significant positive influence on audit fees is recorded for the non-accounting financial expertise. However, the holding of additional directorships has a significant negative impact on audit fees. This study also finds that audit committee members' financial expertise has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor independence. The study also documents that audit committee members serving longer on the boards do not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor. This study also records a significant positive impact of the holding of additional directorships on the provision of non-audit fee ratio, thus signifying a profound support for the busyness hypothesis which argues that overstretched directors are not very good monitors of financial reporting quality. Furthermore, this study finds broadly consistent evidence that audit committees meeting three or more times per year and fully independent audit committees exert a significant positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study also finds some evidence (depending on the earnings model used) that the level of ownership of audit committee members also exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings, highlighting the fact that audit committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered more effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. On the other hand, this study finds evidence that the busyness of audit committee members (busyness defined in terms of the holding of board seats in other companies) has a significant negative impact on the quality of reported earnings. The composite variables (i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms of audit committee composition and operation, has a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore offers a contemporary analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality. The study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of audit committee characteristics and methods employed to quantify these characteristics, but also in the use of various proxies developed to capture the true essence of financial reporting quality. The choice of multiple measurement methods both for the dependent and independent variables facilitates a much richer investigation into the relationship between governance and financial reporting quality variables. Therefore this study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the association between the various audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in the wake of recently introduced regulatory recommendations. These findings will also have policy implications as regulators around the world continue to define and refine the desired characteristics and behaviour of audit committees. Therefore, the findings of this study will ensure future policy changes regarding audit committees are adequately informed.
| Author | : James D. Whitworth |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 73 |
| Release | : 2010 |
| Genre | : Accounting |
| ISBN | : |
My dissertation examines the impact of audit committee financial expertise on the circumstances and likelihood of an auditor change. Auditor changes are costly events associated with decreased financial reporting quality. The audit committee is in position to influence the timing and circumstances surrounding these changes through their role overseeing the external financial reporting process. I find that audit committees with greater accounting expertise are associated with fewer auditor changes overall, more auditor dismissals when there is an auditor change, greater industry expertise by the successor auditor, and an increase in financial reporting quality following the auditor change. I find no consistent evidence supporting the impact of supervisory expertise influencing any of the above outcomes.
| Author | : Richard Steinberg |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 126 |
| Release | : 2000 |
| Genre | : Audit committees |
| ISBN | : 9780894134463 |
| Author | : Zabihollah Rezaee |
| Publisher | : Business Expert Press |
| Total Pages | : 190 |
| Release | : 2016-07-08 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1631571559 |
The audit committee has gained considerable attention in the aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The audit committee’s role has evolved from a voluntary liaison between management and external auditors to the standing committee of the board of directors in overseeing all aspects of corporate governance, financial reporting, internal controls, risk assessment, and audit activities. This book addresses the determinants of audit committee oversight effectiveness, including their composition, independence, authority, resources, diligence, and activities. The book is organized into three separate volumes and each volume can be utilized separately or in an integrated form. The first volume consists of five chapters, which examine the relevance and fundamentals of the audit committees as well as the determinants of audit committee effectiveness. The second volume consists of nine chapters on financial, auditing, internal control, risk management, ethics and compliance, antifraud, and other oversight functions of the audit committee. The third volume consists of five chapters on the emerging issues of audit committees pertaining to evaluation, education, reporting, and accountability as well as audit committees of private companies, governmental entities and not-for-profit organizations.
