Over the course of four decades of Assad rule, first by the father and then the son, organic mechanisms for producing local elite members who were effective and legitimate leaders were paralyzed as a result of the security, economic and social policies that the regime pursued in the city of Deir Ez-Zor. This produced a weak local society with a weak elite who were side-lined by the course of events immediately following the outbreak of the revolution in 2011. Then, during the war and the siege that Islamic State imposed on the enclave in the city under regime control, new influential actors emerged with diverse affiliations and backgrounds. In the war economy network that has formed in this region, some of these new actors have been able to build relationships and partnerships with the heads of the intelligence services, prominent army officers and the governor. The regime regained complete control over the city of Deir Ez-Zor in autumn 2017 following a joint military campaign that included Syrian Arab Army units and their auxiliary militias, Russian forces and militias affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The city then entered a transitional phase in which a local elite has re-formed. This new elite includes local warlords and members of the previous elite who had steered clear of the events of the previous years and then returned to resume their roles and become directly influential actors. To a lesser extent, the new elite also includes individuals who enjoy 'professional competences,' but such actors remain weak in comparison to the main centres of power, clout and influence. The precise boundaries of this new elite stratum are not yet fully apparent, but its main features and characteristics have become clear. Competence, qualifications and inherited social capital matter very little as criteria for joining it. Instead, the most important criteria are absolute loyalty to the regime, wealth acquired by any means and the ability to build and consolidate relationships in decision-making circles - both at the local level with the heads of the intelligence services and at the national level with the regime's highest security and economic clique. Intelligence and military domination alone are not sufficient to achieve firm long-lasting control over society. The regime therefore has to rebuild the civilian arms of its power, including in the political dimension, pursued through a revival of the Baath party and its attendant organizations; in the economic and services dimension, through re-opening government agencies, companies and directorates; in the legal dimension, through reconstruction of the judicial and police services; and in the administrative dimension, through the reconstitution of local governance units via pro-forma elections fixed in favour of candidates hand-picked by the regime. Following a contentious period in which army officers from other provinces gained transient partial control over the local hierarchy of authority, the heads of the intelligence services are recovering their domination over the highest ranks of local power. Deir Ez-Zor's new elite - which the intelligence services helped create, if they did not create it single-handedly - is likewise currently being subordinated to them.