The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the tension that exists between the concepts of continuity and culmination. While continuity states a commander must exploit every initiative presented to keep the enemy under unrelenting pressure, culmination is the result of carrying one's attack too far and can result in dire consequences. The interplay between these concepts presents the operational commander with many important questions. How far should an attack be pressed? Should continuity or culmination be the overriding principle? Do these ideas have applications at all levels of war, and are they pertinent to future conflicts? The methodology used to help answer these questions was three-fold. First, doctrine was inspected both at the joint and service levels for guidance on balancing these principles. Next, historical case studies were analyzed to see how operational commanders had controlled these principles, both in unlimited and limited war. Finally, the effects of future operational principles, such as those delineated in Joint Vision 2010, were studied for their impact on continuity and culmination. This monograph concludes that culmination and continuity is adequately addressed in Joint doctrine but is inconsistently discussed in the various service doctrine. From a historical perspective, the operational commander should be most concerned with culmination in unlimited war and continuity, especially in the war termination phase during limited war. Finally, although the harnessing of future technologies will undoubtedly improve the efficiency of combat, it will not entirely remove the possibility of culmination.