Tactical Victory Leading to Operational Failure
Author | : Jeffrey L. LaFace |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Strategy |
ISBN | : |
Download Tactical Victory Leading to Operational Failure Book in PDF, Epub and Kindle
Download Tactical Victory Leading To Operational Failure Rommel In North Africa full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Tactical Victory Leading To Operational Failure Rommel In North Africa ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : Jeffrey L. LaFace |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Strategy |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Major Jeffrey L. LaFace |
Publisher | : Pickle Partners Publishing |
Total Pages | : 60 |
Release | : 2014-08-15 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1782898042 |
Since the end of the Cold War, the worldview is that the US is presently the only superpower. The expectation, within the Department of Defense and the world's other military institutions, is that this status will exist for the next twenty years or until the year 2020. Even as the world's only superpower, the U. military has adopted a formal approach to joint and coalition warfare as the methodology to fight future military conflicts. This is for two reasons. The first reason is to gain world and national political consensus and legitimacy for any operation requiring the use of US military forces. The second reason is even the military resources of the US are limited and we must conduct military operations as part of a joint coalition force in order to reach our and the coalition's political endstate. This monograph asks the question: Can tactical victories guarantee the accomplishment of the coalition's operational aim? This monograph will use the example of the Afrika Korps in North Africa to answer this question. The purpose of the monograph is to show the outcome when a more militarily capable member of a coalition dictates the conduct of military operations. This consideration is relevant to the US Army due to our superpower status and our military capabilities relative to the rest of the world's military organizations. The monograph will show that Rommel's reliance on the tactical level of war and his lack of an operational understanding of what he was attempting to accomplish lead to their defeat in North Africa. Rommel's conducted tactical operations because he was not trained for or capable of conducting operational art. Because of this, he failed to support the strategic and operational aims of the political and military leadership. He lacked the cognitive creativity and therefore, the tension to support his government. Rommel's opportunism led to many victories on the battlefield but ultimately had an adverse effect on the Axis war effort.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 49 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Since the end of the Cold War, the worldview is that the United States is presently the only superpower. The expectation, within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the world's other military institutions, is that this status will exist for the next twenty years or until the year 2020. Even as the world's only superpower, the United States military has adopted a formal approach to joint and coalition warfare as the methodology to fight future military conflicts. This is for two reasons. The first reason is to gain world and national political consensus and legitimacy for any operation requiring the use of U.S. military forces. The second reason is even the military resources of the United States are limited and we must conduct military operations as part of a joint coalition force in order to reach our and the coalition's political endstate. This monograph asks the question: Can tactical victories guarantee the accomplishment of the coalition's operational aim? This monograph will use the example of the German Afrika Korps in North Africa to answer this question. The purpose of the monograph is to show the outcome when a more militarily capable member of a coalition dictates the conduct of military operations. This consideration is relevant to the United States Army due to our superpower status and our military capabilities relative to the rest of the world's military organizations. The monograph will show that Rommel's reliance on the tactical level of war and his lack of an operational understanding of what he was attempting to accomplish lead to their defeat in North Africa. Rommel conducted tactical operations because he was not trained for or capable of conducting operational art. Because of this, he failed to support the strategic and operational aims of the political and military leadership. He lacked the cognitive creativity and therefore, the tension to support his government.
Author | : Major Donald E. Kirkland |
Publisher | : Pickle Partners Publishing |
Total Pages | : 222 |
Release | : 2014-08-15 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1782894217 |
Includes the War in North Africa Illustration Pack - 112 photos/illustrations and 21 maps. This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel’s tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel’s operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel’s problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel’s tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel’s failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel’s plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives. Rommel’s weakness at the operational level led to failure to sequence tactical victories to achieve campaign goals. This failure illustrates the importance of understanding how operational art orchestrates tactical activities to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations.
Author | : Donald E. Kirkland |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 42 |
Release | : 1986 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel's tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel's operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel's problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel's tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel's failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel's plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives.
Author | : Jonathan Fennell |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 967 |
Release | : 2019-01-24 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1107030951 |
Jonathan Fennell captures for the first time the true wartime experience of the ordinary soldiers from across the empire who made up the British and Commonwealth armies. He analyses why the great battles were won and lost and how the men that fought went on to change the world.
Author | : Jack D Kern Editor |
Publisher | : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform |
Total Pages | : 266 |
Release | : 2018-10-12 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781727846430 |
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
Author | : Peter Caddick-Adams |
Publisher | : Abrams |
Total Pages | : 446 |
Release | : 2013-09-24 |
Genre | : Biography & Autobiography |
ISBN | : 1468309064 |
“An accessible, well-honed study of two fascinating characters” who famously fought each other in numerous battles during WWII, from Egypt to D-Day (Kirkus). Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel faced one another in a series of extraordinary battles that established each man as one of the greatest generals in history. Born four years apart, their lives were remarkably similar. Each came from provincial roots, nearly died in WWI, yet emerged from that great conflict with glowing records. Through their many duels, including their legendary conflicts in North Africa and later at the Normandy D-Day invasion, Peter Caddick-Adams tracks and compares their military talents and personalities. Monty and Rommel explores how each general was raised to power by their war leaders, Churchill and Hitler, and how the innovative military strategy and thought of both permeate down to today's armies.
Author | : Leo J. Meyer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 1990 |
Genre | : World War, 1939-1945 |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Ken Ford |
Publisher | : Bloomsbury Publishing |
Total Pages | : 180 |
Release | : 2011-01-01 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1849087245 |
Illustrated by contemporary photos and specially commissioned maps, this book is a fascinating account of Rommel's greatest victory. Following a lull in the desert war which saw the Germans and British reinforce their armies, Rommel suddenly attacked British fortifications with an assault on the northern sector of the British line near Gazala. Pinning down the British in the north and outflanking the 1st Free French Brigade, Rommel succeeded in encircling the main British positions, trapping them in what became known as 'The Cauldron'. With thousands of British soldiers killed or taken prisoner, this was a devastating defeat for the Allies. Accompanied by contemporary photographs and maps depicting the movement of both armies, Ken Ford provides a masterful study of Rommel, the 'Desert Fox', at the height of his powers as he swept the British army back to the site of their final stand at El Alamein.