Domestic and international safeguards considerations of the various plutonium disposition program options were studied. The options included immobilization in either glass or ceramic; deep borehole disposal, either directly as oxide or after immobilization in ceramic pellets; and nine options of burning in reactors as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Two of the MOX options considered burning in CANDU (Canadian deuterium uranium) reactors in Canada; the remaining options used either existing or new reactors in the US. A facility for conversion of weapons-grade PU metal to plutonium oxide is common to all options. Although domestic safeguards are applied for all material in the facility, international verification probably will not be possible until weapons design information from material form can no longer be inferred. Assuming that the facility processed 5 tonnes of Pu/year and all measurements are made to meet 1993 ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association) Target Values, the best annual detection limit (false alarm probability = 0.05, detection probability = 0.95) for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 16.5 kg, and probably will be higher. A MOX fuel fabrication facility is required for all of the reactor options, and location of the facility either in the US or in a EURATOM country was considered. Assuming that the facility processes 3.2 tonnes of Pu/year, and all measurements are made to meet ESARDA Target Values, the best annual detection limit for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 24 kg. Location in Europe adds an additional international safeguards burden. Impact of the various disposal options on domestic and international safeguards will be reviewed.