Rapid Decisive Operations has emerged as the primary Joint Warfighting Concept for the Future Force. It anticipates-as its name suggests-leveraging American technological advantages to quickly and utterly overwhelm an opponent. Yet the theory has its roots in the mid-1990s concept of "Shock and Awe," as popularized by Harlan Ullman. This monograph then questions whether a pre-9/11 concept can fulfill the requirements of what is generally known as the "Bush Doctrine," the commitment to preemptive war against terrorists and states which sponsor or facilitate them. The monograph first defines the Bush Doctrine, using various Presidential speeches and the National Security Strategy. The Doctrine can be simplified as a commitment to preemptive war against terrorists groups, weak states that facilitate terrorist groups, and rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups. The central chapter of the monograph then defines Rapid Decisive Operations, highlighting its commitment to using asymmetrical effects in a rapid tempo to produce "cybershock," or the inability to react to American operations and demands. The fourth chapter then uses these four features of Rapid Decisive Operations and examines their utility against each of the three groups mentioned in the Bush Doctrine. The final chapters draws conclusions, and while Rapid Decisive Operations is not judged to be utterly without merit, the concept is found to lack applicability in the areas of warfare most likely to face the United States in coming decades. The monograph concludes by recommending that Joint Forces Command re- examine the assumptions underlying Rapid Decisive Operations and consider designing a new Joint Warfighting Concept from properly validated assumptions.