Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Total Pages: 161
Release: 2014-12-02
Genre: Medical
ISBN: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance

The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance
Author: John A. Nyman
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Total Pages: 228
Release: 2003
Genre: Health & Fitness
ISBN: 9780804744881

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Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance
Author: Olesya Kazantseva
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 20
Release: 2014-07-18
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 3656699003

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Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.

Care Without Coverage

Care Without Coverage
Author: Institute of Medicine
Publisher: National Academies Press
Total Pages: 213
Release: 2002-06-20
Genre: Medical
ISBN: 0309083435

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Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective
Author: Anke Höhmann
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 26
Release: 2017-06-12
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3668462631

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Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the costs are ascribed to the insured persons ́ behavior or lifestyle. The insured person is led to an increased demand of medical services than without an insurance. But also doctors or pharmacists may be evidenced „unethical“ behavior on the part of supply-induced demand. Is it really an unethical or rather a rational behavior? Which experiences have been made with a higher self-participation of the insured people? In which context stay health care services and price elasticity? And how can you reduce the problem of moral hazard? These are just a few questions which will be examined in this paper. The first chapter begins with health insurance in general and explains the benefits and the risks of being insured. The second chapter gives a generally valid definition of moral hazard as well as in terms of health insurance in particular. The third chapter shows the empirical perspective from the point of view of insured people and doctors. Thereby, it will enlarge on the RAND experiment and the price elasticity in the German market. The fourth chapter gives a few solutions for moral hazard effects, whereby solutions for insured people and for alternative financing are here in the focus. The last chapter will give a conclusion to the discussed topic.

Exposed

Exposed
Author: Christopher T. Robertson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Total Pages: 257
Release: 2019-12-17
Genre: Law
ISBN: 067424317X

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A sharp exposé of the roots of the cost-exposure consensus in American health care that shows how the next wave of reform can secure real access and efficiency. The toxic battle over how to reshape American health care has overshadowed the underlying bipartisan agreement that health insurance coverage should be incomplete. Both Democrats and Republicans expect patients to bear a substantial portion of health care costs through deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. In theory this strategy empowers patients to make cost-benefit tradeoffs, encourages thrift and efficiency in a system rife with waste, and defends against the moral hazard that can arise from insurance. But in fact, as Christopher T. Robertson reveals, this cost-exposure consensus keeps people from valuable care, causes widespread anxiety, and drives many patients and their families into bankruptcy and foreclosure. Marshalling a decade of research, Exposed offers an alternative framework that takes us back to the core purpose of insurance: pooling resources to provide individuals access to care that would otherwise be unaffordable. Robertson shows how the cost-exposure consensus has changed the meaning and experience of health care and exchanged one form of moral hazard for another. He also provides avenues of reform. If cost exposure remains a primary strategy, physicians, hospitals, and other providers must be held legally responsible for communicating those costs to patients, and insurance companies should scale cost exposure to individuals’ ability to pay. New and more promising models are on the horizon, if only we would let go our misguided embrace of incomplete insurance.

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 67
Release: 1989
Genre:
ISBN:

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Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.

Selection on moral hazard in health insurance

Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
Author: Liran Einav
Publisher:
Total Pages: 68
Release: 2011
Genre: Adverse selection (Insurance)
ISBN:

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Abstract: In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral response to the insurance contract. Such "selection on moral hazard" can have important implications for attempts to combat either selection or moral hazard. We explore these issues using individual-level panel data from a single firm, which contain information about health insurance options, choices, and subsequent claims. To identify the behavioral response to health insurance coverage and the heterogeneity in it, we take advantage of a change in the health insurance options offered to some, but not all of the firm's employees. We begin with descriptive evidence that is suggestive of both heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, with individuals who select more coverage also appearing to exhibit greater behavioral response to that coverage. To formalize this analysis and explore its implications, we develop and estimate a model of plan choice and medical utilization. The results from the modeling exercise echo the descriptive evidence, and allow for further explorations of the interaction between selection and moral hazard. For example, one implication of our estimates is that abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead one to substantially over-estimate the spending reduction associated with introducing a high deductible health insurance option

Health Insurance

Health Insurance
Author: Michael A. Morrisey
Publisher: Asociation of University Programs in Health Administration/Health Administration Press
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2020
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9781640551602

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History of Health Insurance in the United States -- The Affordable Care Act -- A Summary of Insurance Coverage -- The Demand for Insurance -- Adverse Selection -- Underwriting and Rate Making -- Risk Adjustment -- Moral Hazard and Prices -- Utilization Management -- Managed Care, Selective Contracting, and the Insurance Industry -- Provider Consolidation, Monopsony Power, and the Managed Care Backlash -- Insurance Market Structure, Conduct, and Performance -- Premium Sensitivity and Health Insurance -- Compensating Differentials -- Taxes and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance -- Employers as Agents -- Health Savings Accounts and Consumer-Directed Health Plans -- The Small-Group Market -- The Individual Insurance Market -- Health Insurance Regulation -- High-Risk Pools -- An Overview of Medicare -- Retiree Coverage -- Medicaid, Crowd-Out, and Long-Term Care Insurance.

Handbook of Health Economics

Handbook of Health Economics
Author: Mark V. Pauly
Publisher: Elsevier
Total Pages: 1149
Release: 2012-01-05
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0444535926

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"As a relatively new subdiscipline of economics, health economics has made many contributions to areas of the main discipline, such as insurance economics. This volume provides a survey of the burgeoning literature on the subject of health economics." {source : site de l'éditeur].