This monograph determines whether the U.S. Army is sufficiently training, organizing, and equipping fire support elements to utilize naval surface fire support. Its scope is restricted to fire support elements in airborne, air assault and light infantry units. This study came as a result of the Marine Corps' decision to deactivate their ANGLICO units, which had habitually provided the expertise to Army forced and early entry units to utilize naval surface fire support. Without these units, the Army must rely on its organic fire supporters to request and control naval fires. To accomplish this, they must first be properly trained, organized, and equipped. This topic becomes increasingly important as the Army moves to a force projection structure. The Army has put enormous strain on its own helicopter lift as well as the Air Force's strategic lift assets. To preclude having to use these assets to initially transport artillery and ammunition to support early ground maneuver, the Army must prepare to use naval fire support when available. The Navy is currently developing a suite of systems to provide naval fire support to support Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea doctrine. The Army must plan now to utilize these systems in the future. The monograph studies the historical aspects of naval gunfire and the units that were created to request it. This leads into a study of training, organization, and equipment of both ANGLICO and Army fire support elements to determine critical variances between them that would limit the Army's ability to control naval surface fires. Major findings show that while the Army is organized properly to perform this mission if manned at 100 percent strength, current equipping and training of fire support elements is inadequate. Equipment shortfalls are being addressed in the near term by installation of SINCGARS on Navy ships.