The aim of this study is to examine and critically evaluate the philosophy of religion of John Hick. I refer to his having a philosophy of religion in the sense that he advocates a method of philosophical inquiry and consequently an understanding of religious phenomena that he takes to be integral to his own unique philosophical theology. In order to evaluate his views in their context, the first three chapters provide an introduction both to his overall position and to the contemporary issues with which he deals. Thereafter I proceed with my criticisms, finding most importantly that he does not have sufficient justification for the kind of theistic claims he wants to make. I reach this conclusion by playing him against his own empirical orientation to matters of fact, and since the veracity of his account of this empiricist linguistic framework is assumed, my evaluation of his work is carried on internally. My criticisms generally depend upon a lack of consistency and coherence within Hick's system of thought itself. Little attention is given to the strengths and liabilities of any particular philosophical or theological orientation he may adopt. My strategy is to assume the legitimacy of these orientations in the manner they happen to be construed by his system. In doing so, I find that he attempts to build upon a secular empiricist base that excludes the possibility of the theological superstructure he hopes to erect.