Ongoing shortages of agricultural workers have increased concerns about long-run sustainability for many U.S. producers. Particularly for producers of labor-intensive crops, employers are worried that labor shortages will lead to unharvested fields, lower outputs, and falling profits. Employers, policy makers, and academics can benefit from understanding factors that affect worker productivity, output quality, and worker labor supply. In my dissertation, I examine the effects of a minimum wage increase on worker productivity, the link between a worker's speed and the quality of output produced, and the determinants of intensive-margin labor supply. As a whole, my dissertation sheds light on behavioral responses to incentives in the workplace and shows how these responses can cause inefficiencies in federal, state, and employer policies. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I study how minimum wages and piece rate wages can interact to affect worker productivity. In the United States, minimum wage laws set a lower bound on earnings of piece rate workers. In agriculture, piece rates and productivity levels often result in minimum wages acting as a binding earnings floor. I develop a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate how an increase in this binding wage floor can cause workers to reduce effort and thus decrease productivity. I give empirical evidence of this prediction using the payroll records of strawberry harvesters on a large farm in Northern California. Using a fixed effects model, I estimate the productivity change of the average worker in response to increases in an employer-set base wage. Results support the theoretical predictions and indicate that a three percent increase in the wage floor causes the average worker to decrease productivity by seven percent. In the second chapter, I use the same data on worker productivity to explore the relationship between a worker's speed and the quality of the output she delivers. The link between speed and quality is of direct financial interest to employers and contributes to the understanding of effects from productivity-enhancing policies in the workplace. Using a naive OLS regression, I find a negative and significant relationship between speed and quality. I then separate speed into a worker's average seasonal speed and within-day shocks to her speed. I find that the link between speed and quality is driven by shocks to speed, rather than a worker's average speed. In particular, I find that when a worker works ten percent faster than her average, the quality of her output, measured as the percent of strawberries delivered without any defects, is 0.4 percentage points lower. In light of the strong correlation between speed shocks and quality, I use an IV approach to elicit causal estimates of the effect of speed on quality through exogenous shocks to speed. I find that a ten percent increase in a worker's speed, induced by an increase in the piece rate, causes the quality of her output to decrease by four percentage points. These findings have important implications for employers in terms of optimal contract structure and monitoring. Further, the analysis presents novel evidence on worker behavior that makes significant contributions to the field of labor economics. Namely, while a large body of literature has examined the productivity-effects of various workplace policies, this is the first to document the negative externalities these impose on quality.The third chapter of my dissertation uses nationally representative data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey to examine the labor supply determinants of U.S. crop workers. In this paper, I present trends in the demographic profile of the U.S. agricultural workforce, I demonstrate the link between intensive-margin labor supply and the changing demographic characteristics, and I examine the potential of various employer policies for increasing intensive-margin labor supply. I find statistically significant differences in labor supply across several key demographic characteristics: citizenship status, age, parental status, and gender. I find that native-born citizens work fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year than both documented and undocumented immigrant workers. I find that middle-aged workers (aged 25-44) work more hours per week than younger or older workers, but older workers (aged 45 and up) work more weeks each year. I find that parents work significantly more weeks per year than non-parents but work a similar number of hours. Males work significantly more hours and weeks than females. I additionally show causal evidence on the effects of various employer policies on intensive-margin labor supply. Among offering higher wages, health benefits, or pay bonuses, I find that bonuses are the only employer policy that statistically significantly increase worker labor supply. I find that offering a bonus causes the average worker to increase weekly hours of labor by ten percent and to increase annual weeks working in agriculture by 6.5 weeks. My findings imply that the way in which the the agricultural workforce is aging will cause the hours and weeks of labor provided by employed farmworkers to increase, while the changes in gender and family composition will cause labor supply to decrease. Further, my findings suggest that an effective employer option for increasing both hours and weeks of work in agriculture is to offer workers bonuses. These findings bear importance for employers, academics, and policy makers seeking to better understand the US agricultural workforce.