This dissertation aims to understand how insiders in Asian markets (i.e., China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea) trade in response to various financial information that are either released by their firms or by third-party, in the framework of agency and signaling theory. This dissertation builds upon three stand-alone papers that explore three different types of accounting settings where financial information is important: (1) auditor opinions, (2) earnings management, and (3) goodwill impairment. The first chapter investigates how insiders trade prior to the issuance of first-time modified audit opinions in an Asian context. I use agency and signaling theoretical frameworks to test the link between insider trading activities and the issuance of different types of modified audit opinions. The second chapter examines whether insiders at politically-connected firms are more likely to manage earnings if they plan to trade stocks after an earnings announcement, compared to insiders at non-connected firms. I use anti-corruption cases involving the ouster of high-level Chinese government officials as a natural experiment setting and adopt difference-in-differences model. The third chapter of my dissertation uses agency and signaling theoretical frameworks to compare insider trading that is informed by impending news of accounting goodwill impairment at firms with positive expectations and at firms with negative expectations regarding prospects in an Asian context.