Health Insurance

Health Insurance
Author: Willard G. Manning
Publisher:
Total Pages: 639
Release: 1997
Genre: Health insurance
ISBN:

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Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 67
Release: 1989
Genre:
ISBN:

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Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Total Pages: 161
Release: 2014-12-02
Genre: Medical
ISBN: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance

Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance
Author: Amanda E. Kowalski
Publisher:
Total Pages: 50
Release: 2012
Genre: Economics
ISBN:

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Insurance induces a well-known tradeoff between the welfare gains from risk protection and the welfare losses from moral hazard. Empirical work traditionally estimates each side of the tradeoff separately, potentially yielding mutually inconsistent results. I develop a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance that allows for the calculation of both sides of the tradeoff simultaneously, allowing for a relationship between moral hazard and risk protection. An important feature of this model is that it considers nonlinearities in the consumer budget set that arise from deductibles, coinsurance rates, and stoplosses that alter moral hazard as well as risk protection relative to no insurance. I illustrate the properties of my model by estimating it using data on employer sponsored health insurance from a large firm. Within my empirical context, the average deadweight losses from moral hazard substantially outweigh the average welfare gains from risk protection. However, the welfare impact of moral hazard and risk protection are both small relative to transfers from the government through the tax preference for employer sponsored health insurance and transfers from some agents to other agents through a common premium.

Pooling Health Insurance Risks

Pooling Health Insurance Risks
Author: Mark V. Pauly
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
Total Pages: 120
Release: 1999
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780844741192

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Uncertainty about risks to health virtually requires that people have health insurance. But how is the cost of premiums determined? Should rates vary according to some indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the young and the healthy actually subsidize the old and the unhealthy?

Exposed

Exposed
Author: Christopher T. Robertson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Total Pages: 257
Release: 2019-12-17
Genre: Law
ISBN: 067424317X

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A sharp exposé of the roots of the cost-exposure consensus in American health care that shows how the next wave of reform can secure real access and efficiency. The toxic battle over how to reshape American health care has overshadowed the underlying bipartisan agreement that health insurance coverage should be incomplete. Both Democrats and Republicans expect patients to bear a substantial portion of health care costs through deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. In theory this strategy empowers patients to make cost-benefit tradeoffs, encourages thrift and efficiency in a system rife with waste, and defends against the moral hazard that can arise from insurance. But in fact, as Christopher T. Robertson reveals, this cost-exposure consensus keeps people from valuable care, causes widespread anxiety, and drives many patients and their families into bankruptcy and foreclosure. Marshalling a decade of research, Exposed offers an alternative framework that takes us back to the core purpose of insurance: pooling resources to provide individuals access to care that would otherwise be unaffordable. Robertson shows how the cost-exposure consensus has changed the meaning and experience of health care and exchanged one form of moral hazard for another. He also provides avenues of reform. If cost exposure remains a primary strategy, physicians, hospitals, and other providers must be held legally responsible for communicating those costs to patients, and insurance companies should scale cost exposure to individuals’ ability to pay. New and more promising models are on the horizon, if only we would let go our misguided embrace of incomplete insurance.

Health Reform without Side Effects

Health Reform without Side Effects
Author: Mark V. Pauly
Publisher: Hoover Press
Total Pages: 123
Release: 2013-09-01
Genre: Medical
ISBN: 0817910468

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Mark V. Pauly offers a detailed look at the individual insurance market in the United States. He explains how it works, suggests approaches to improvement that build on what currently works well, and provides a realistic assessment of how much improvement we can demand and expect. He concludes that, although there are some serious deficiencies in today's individual insurance market, there are also some important advantages in this market that should be preserved.

Fatal Tradeoffs

Fatal Tradeoffs
Author: W. Kip Viscusi
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 321
Release: 1992-08-13
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0198023693

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Ideally, it would be desirable if we could all adopt a high-minded commitment to a risk-free existence. Unfortunately, such an objective is beyond our reach--politicians who advocate higher taxes rarely get elected and economists who indicate that our resources are limited are often portrayed as purveyors of pessimism. Fatal Tradeoffs culminates and synthesizes the research of the government's expert on the value of life and risk regulation. This volume presents Viscusi's work in the social regulation of risk, this volume covers topics relating to the value and empirical estimates of life, the rationality of individual responses to risk, and the role of government policy. In addition to a careful selection of his writings, Fatal Tradeoffs includes a new survey of the value-of-life literature, a review of the 1980s regulatory reforms, and guidelines for risk policy. Balanced with case studies, the more technical articles have been opened to include policy ramifications, making the text accessible to professionals and academics alike.