FHA Loan Limits
Author | : United States. General Accounting Office |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1999 |
Genre | : Housing |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : United States. General Accounting Office |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1999 |
Genre | : Housing |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 132 |
Release | : 2004 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Patric H. Hendershott |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 23 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : Housing |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 8 |
Release | : 2019 |
Genre | : Housing |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States Accounting Office (GAO) |
Publisher | : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform |
Total Pages | : 24 |
Release | : 2018-03-14 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781984386496 |
RCED-99-78 FHA Loan Limits: Finance Board Data Are a Reasonable Source of Home Sales Prices
Author | : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 76 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Kevin Park |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 12 |
Release | : 2017 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Section 203 of the National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to provide federally backed insurance of home mortgages against the risk of default. FHA insurance typically serves borrowers with higher perceived credit risk, including first-time homebuyers and minority borrowers. FHA is also restricted to loan amounts less than a maximum limit. Historically, these loan limits have tended to not keep pace with house price appreciation, further focusing FHA insurance on a narrowing segment of the mortgage market. But in response to the collapse of house prices and rising foreclosures, Congress enacted legislation in 2008 that drastically increased the maximum loan amount eligible for FHA insurance. Although subsequently extended, the higher loan limits expired at the end of 2013. The changes in loan limits create a natural experiment to measure the effect of the availability of FHA mortgage insurance on the mortgage market. The exogenous variation in FHA eligibility provides an improvement over previous research on the substitution between FHA and conventional (i.e., not insured by the Veterans Administration, Department of Agriculture, or FHA) mortgage lending.
Author | : U S Government Accountability Office (G |
Publisher | : BiblioGov |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 2013-06 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781289072483 |
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that works for Congress. The GAO watches over Congress, and investigates how the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. The Comptroller General of the United States is the leader of the GAO, and is appointed to a 15-year term by the U.S. President. The GAO wants to support Congress, while at the same time doing right by the citizens of the United States. They audit, investigate, perform analyses, issue legal decisions and report anything that the government is doing. This is one of their reports.
Author | : Zeynep Onder |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 950 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Home ownership |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Min Hwang |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 57 |
Release | : 2017 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
This paper examines the impacts of changes in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured loan limit in response to the Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008. We use difference-in-difference approaches to compare the number of transactions and average loan-to-value ratios for properties located in high-cost areas and low-cost areas, before and after the ESA policy change. We find that the increase in loan limits does results larger demand for FHA loans, both in quantity and quality. However, the behavior is not driven by incentives to buy more housing or by wealth constraints. We find evidence of increased moral hazard in the sense that increased loan limits induced riskier borrowers (allowed “cherry-picking” against FHA), and that much of the increased demand for FHA loans came at the expense of other loans. For instance, newly qualified borrowers, especially via cash-out refinance loans, are more likely to take advantage of increased loan limit policy, and adjust their LTVs. Also, newly qualified loans had higher default rates and higher loss given default rate.