Social scientists explain events by identifying reasons and causes. Occasionally they weave a series of occurrences into a historical narrative. What is entailed in each kind of explanation? What are the philosophical assumptions that inform them? Which form of explanation is adequate for the human sciences? Does the hermeneutic method offer a viable alternative to the causal and narrative forms? Is hermeneutic understanding significantly different from an explanation in terms of reasons? This book addresses such questions, which have dominated debates in the philosophy of social science, and provides a lucid treatment of issues concerning the adequacy of different forms of explanation. In her analysis the author distances herself from those who refer to the distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences either to discredit or to privilege a particular method for the study of social phenomena. Instead, she argues that social reality can be conceived in different ways, and that different forms of inquiry - e.g. hermeneutic understanding, narrative, reason-action and causal explanation - represent various ways in which we think about and interrogate that reality. Each of these illuminate a specific dimension of reality and serve different cognitive interests. While acknowledging the significance of various modes of explanation and understanding for the human sciences, the author maintains that the significance of the hermeneutic mode lies in its distinctive conception of social reality, history and knowledge. This conception must inform all analysis of social and historical phenomena. To the extent that narrative can be creatively informed by hermeneutic philosophy, itcan offer adequate explanations of social and historical events.