While there is much agreement in the climate policy literature that climate change mitigation should not interfere with humans' ability to enjoy a minimal standard of living, there is little scholarship on how to carve out such an "exemption" for poor subpopulations within large developing economies. Further, there is little analysis in developing countries of how the burdens of specific mitigation policies would be distributed. This dissertation begins to fill these gaps. This work consists of three studies, the first two of which are positive studies of the income distributional impacts of two energy policies that have climate mitigation benefits in Maharashtra, India: electricity pricing to recover low-carbon electric supply; and removal of the kerosene subsidy. In the first study I use an economic simulation model of the electricity sector and household welfare to assess the impacts of economy-wide electricity price increases under different political and institutional constraints. The analysis reveals that regulators can insulate low-income households from welfare losses without trading off aggregate welfare losses as long as they can raise prices to industry and high-income households. Mitigation may also have a co-benefit of reducing supply interruptions to the poor. In the second study, the kerosene subsidy is found to be progressive and material in urban areas, but regressive and less material in rural areas. One reason is that households' allocated quotas far exceed kerosene demand in rural areas, but fall short of many urban households' needs. A better targeted subsidy in urban areas alone would avoid high costs of the current subsidy, yet avoid the impoverishment of urban users from their complete removal. These results emphasize that protecting the interests of the poor in international climate change mitigation agreements requires some accountability from the institutions that implement mitigation policies within states. The third study questions the adequacy of burden-sharing proposals for climate mitigation that advocate an exemption for the poor without accounting for states' agency over the costs and outcomes of such an exemption. Participating states face moral hazards over the choice of future baselines of the poor's emissions. I show - using India for illustration - that the financial stakes for parties in how future growth is distributed in India can be up to tens of billions of dollars. Getting agreement on the terms of exemption may be easier if benefiting states adopt comparative benchmarks of accountability for the poor's emissions, but which do not infringe on particular policy choices. Furthermore, participating states should have shared duties to ensure that the poor receive the benefits of an awarded exemption.