Contract Law Enforcement
Author | : Robert R. Delahunt |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 100 |
Release | : 1978 |
Genre | : Government publications |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Robert R. Delahunt |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 100 |
Release | : 1978 |
Genre | : Government publications |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 1110 |
Release | : 1990 |
Genre | : Affirmative action programs |
ISBN | : |
Author | : National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 84 |
Release | : 1978 |
Genre | : Law enforcement |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Robert R. Delahunt |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 84 |
Release | : 1978 |
Genre | : Police |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Edward Yorio |
Publisher | : Wolters Kluwer |
Total Pages | : 832 |
Release | : 2011-01-01 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 145480114X |
Rev. ed. of: Contract enforcement / Edward Yorio. c1989.
Author | : Iris Bohnet |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law", it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. This paper studies a contractual relationship where the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and find that economic incentives have a non-monotonic impact on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities. Trustworthiness is "crowded in" with weak and "crowded out" with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model's implications and find support for the crowding prediction. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 18 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : Traffic safety |
ISBN | : |
This Contract Management Manual has been developed to assist cities and counties in the administration of a Law Enforcement Assistance Fund (LEAF) Project. The policies and procedures contained herein are in addition to, and consistent with, the rules and regulations and guidelines developed and issued by the Office of Transportation Safety. The State LEAF Administrator and the concerned party will resolve any differences between local policy and the policy contained herein.
Author | : American Bar Association. House of Delegates |
Publisher | : American Bar Association |
Total Pages | : 216 |
Release | : 2007 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9781590318737 |
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
Author | : Albert E. Yorio |
Publisher | : Aspen Publishers |
Total Pages | : 256 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Shang-Jin Wei |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 64 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Capital movements |
ISBN | : |
Crony capitalism and self-fulfilling expectations by international creditors are often suggested as two rival explanations for currency crisis. This paper examines a possible linkage between the two that has not been explored much in the literature: corruption may affect a country's composition of capital inflows in a way that makes it more likely to experience a currency crisis that is triggered/aided by a sudden reversal of international capital flows. We find robust evidence that poor public governance is associated with a higher loan-to-FDI ratio. Such a composition of capital flows has been identified as being associated with a higher incidence of a currency crisis. We also find some weaker evidence that poor public governance is associated with a country's inability to borrow internationally in its own currency. The latter is also associated with a higher incidence of a currency crisis. To sum up, even though crony capitalism does not forecast the timing of a crisis, it can nevertheless increase its likelihood. This paper illustrates a particular channel through which this can happen.