Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design

Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
Author: Jacob Glazer
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
Total Pages: 153
Release: 2016-08-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9813141336

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This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.

Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design

Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
Author: Luyao Zhang (Ph. D. in economics)
Publisher:
Total Pages: 146
Release: 2018
Genre: Cognitive psychology
ISBN:

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In the history of economic thought lies a dilemma for future economists: should we adopt simple models with unrealistic assumptions, or should we describe human behavior closely but give up elegant abstractions? In the projects above, we endeavor to create a middle way that synthesizes the merits in both directions and leave unanswered questions for future researchers.

Modeling Bounded Rationality

Modeling Bounded Rationality
Author: Ariel Rubinstein
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 226
Release: 1998
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262681001

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The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

Partition Obvious Preference and Mistrust in Mechanism Design

Partition Obvious Preference and Mistrust in Mechanism Design
Author: Luyao Zhang
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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Substantial evidence in field, lab and thought experiments in multiple disciplines, shows that decision makers often choose a dominated strategy, which contradicts with current economic theory. To bridge this gap between theory and evidence, first, we propose two alternative axiomatic approaches, formalizing a distinct defect in human reasoning and tying together a broad range of evidence for the choice of dominated strategies. Second, we extend the theory to game theory and mechanism design, where we identify a rich class of mechanisms that successfully achieve desirable goals even with boundedly rational agents or agents who mistrust the market makers. Third, we test and verify our theory and its implications by a laboratory experiment. Finally, we address how our approach contributes to accomplishing two goals simultaneously in modelling bounded rationality: stimulating transdisciplinary conversations and providing a unified framework.

Game Theory And Mechanism Design

Game Theory And Mechanism Design
Author: Y Narahari
Publisher: World Scientific
Total Pages: 533
Release: 2014-03-13
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 9814525065

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This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.

Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
Author: Suren Basov
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 181
Release: 2016-05-20
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9811010412

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This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

The Future of Economic Design

The Future of Economic Design
Author: Jean-François Laslier
Publisher: Springer Nature
Total Pages: 507
Release: 2019-11-15
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3030180506

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This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.

Bounded Rationality

Bounded Rationality
Author: Gerd Gigerenzer
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 404
Release: 2002-07-26
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262571647

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In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.

Algorithm and Mechanism Design with Nonlinear Preferences

Algorithm and Mechanism Design with Nonlinear Preferences
Author: Ger Yang
Publisher:
Total Pages: 430
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

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In real life, many combinatorial and economic problems have nonlinear objectives and constraints, where the nonlinearities typically arise from different risk preferences, non-rationality, etc. Solving these problems is often computationally hard but can be beneficial by providing more revenue or welfare. In this thesis, I am going to investigate three problems: route planning with a nonlinear objective, dynamic mechanism design with agents of bounded rationality, and economic mechanism design with risk-loving buyers.