The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Task Force focused on defense against regional-level adversary ballistic missiles. It directed the Task Force to consider both technology issues and architectural constructs to accomplish 'Early Intercept' (defined in the TOR as that interval in a ballistic missile's flight between thrust termination and final deployment of warhead(s) and/or countermeasures). In February 2010, the Department of Defense issued a key document that comprehensively outlined the objective of the Nation's ballistic missile defense program (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010). This document clearly spelled out the top priority role of regional ballistic missile defense wherein the U.S. committed itself to defend not only our military assets overseas, but also to provide missile defense assistance to our 'allies and partners.' The U.S. has many allies and partners worldwide, so there is a wide range in the difficulty of achieving defensive coverage of their territories. The collection of allies in Europe represents the largest land mass to cover, and the Task Force devoted much of its analytics to this European theater. However, in examining the issues related to EI in the context of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe (EPAA), the Task Force additionally considered a different kind of 'EI' from that spelled out in the TOR, namely the issues related to using regional forward-based defenses to get an 'early' shot at intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) heading to the U.S. Chapter 1 of this report analyzes the benefits and shortfalls of the EI proposition. As a result of the analyses presented in Chapter 1, certain key attributes of effective Regional Defense became evident, as did some key enablers required to achieve an effective defense. Chapters 2 and 3 review those key attributes and technological enablers, respectively. Overall, we conclude that EI per se is not a particularly useful goal or protocol for design of a regional BMD system. There is often confusion as to what EI means; moreover, it is not fundamental as an attribute of effective ballistic missile defense.