To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influencedby individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison's three models ofbureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value ofinterservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant stridesintegrating the services at the most senior levels, that is, the component commandersand above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander leveland above during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, rational decisions weremade and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model Ibehavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway,however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander.Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisionsand actions were Model I. But at times, decisions and actions were not optimalbecause the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different serviceperspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of theother services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based onthese findings, the study suggests in order to continue to improve interserviceintegration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer'scareer, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization amongtheaters.