Using three European matched employer-employee data sets, I show that workers experiencing high positive or negative changes in wages subsequently have a high propensity of job separation. In all three data sets, a change in wages of 10 percentage points above or below the median coincides with roughly 30% higher odds of job separation. The pattern is more pronounced among low experience workers. Theoretically, I rationalize the empirical finding as a result of information and labor market frictions in a random search model with two-sided heterogeneity and symmetric learning about worker ability. In the framework, workers with low experience have a high initial volatility of wage changes and move between firms to enjoy productivity benefits. I allow for additional channels of wage growth through contract renegotiation and dynamic match productivity and let firms differ in the volatility of production shocks. In the model, workers can partially reduce their wage exposure to productivity shocks by accumulating wage negotiation capital such that the volatility of wage changes falls endogenously on the job ladder. An uneven distribution of volatile firms along the job ladder further increases wage stability with experience. I thereby show that the job ladder does not only determine worker's level of wages but can also account for part of its variability.