The objectives of bank resolution and resolution tools may come into conflict with fundamental rights, such as the freedom to conduct a business, property rights, and the right to a fair trial. This paper investigates bank resolution and its impact on fundamental human-rights and explores the features of a balanced judicial review that guarantees the efficiency of the resolution proceedings while respecting the human-rights safeguards. In doing so, it analyses the fundamental-rights implications in resolution regimes in light of the safeguards enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Given that the actions taken by resolution authorities can result in the infringement of the fundamental rights, ex-post judicial review of resolution schemes is necessary and should guarantee a comprehensive judicial control of resolution actions. To preserve the effectiveness of the resolution tools and to avoid potential destabilizing implications of the ex-post judicial review, the insolvency proceedings are often expedited, confidential, with no suspensive effects and with a limited right of appeal. However, having reviewed the bank insolvency cases involving the infringement of fundamental rights, we conjecture that given the untested nature and uncertain benefits of the bank resolution schemes and the fact that they are expected to only marginally contribute to financial stability, a move towards administrative proceedings for bank insolvency and making judicial review of the administrative proceedings toothless may be unwarranted. We take a more nuanced approach to bank resolution and propose that a blended approach in which only systemically important functions would be handled by an administrative resolution authority and the remainder of the functions would be handled by a bankruptcy court would be preferable. Our proposal is thoroughly aligned with the structural reforms of the banking system such as ring-fencing and subsidiarization, which could play a role in advancing this blended approach.