My dissertation is comprised of three papers on the causes and consequences of the U.S. Great Recession. The emphasis is on the role that financial frictions play in magnifying financial shocks, as well as in informing the effectiveness of potential policies. Chapter 1, "Financial Frictions, Investment Delay and Asset Market Interventions," co-authored with Shouyong Shi, studies the role of investment delay in propagating different types of financial shocks, and how this role impacts the effectiveness of asset market interventions. The topic is motivated by the observation that, during the Great Recession, governments conducted large-scale asset market interventions. The aim was to increase the level of liquidity in the asset market and make it easier for firms to obtain financing. However, firms were observed to have delayed investment by hoarding liquid funds, part of which were obtained through the interventions. We construct a dynamic macro model to incorporate financial frictions and investment delay. Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who face liquidity frictions in the equity market and a collateral constraint in the debt market. After calibrating the model to the U.S. data, we quantitatively examine how aggregate activity is affected by two types of financial shocks: (i) a shock to equity liquidity, and (ii) a shock to entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity. We then analyze the effectiveness of government interventions in the asset market after such financial shocks. In particular, we compare the effects of government purchases of private equity and of private debt in the open market. In addition, we examine how these effects of government interventions depend on the option to delay investment. In Chapter 2, "Housing Liquidity and Unemployment: The Role of Firm Financial Frictions," I build upon the role that firms' ability to obtain funding plays in the severity of the Great Recession. I focus specifically on how the housing crisis reduced the ability of firms to obtain funding, and the consequences for unemployment. An important feature I focus on is the role of housing liquidity, or how easy it is to sell or buy a house. I analyze how an initial fall in housing market liquidity, linked to rising foreclosure costs for banks, affects labor market outcomes, which can have further feedback effects. I focus on the role that firm financial frictions play in these feedback effects. To this end, I construct a dynamic macro model that incorporates frictional housing and labor markets, as well as firm financial frictions. Mortgages are obtained from banks that incur foreclosure costs in the event of default. Foreclosure costs also affect the ease with which firms can borrow, and this influences their hiring decisions. I calibrate the model to U.S. data, and find that a rise in foreclosure costs that generates a 10% fall in the firm loan-to-output ratio results in a 3 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate. The rise in unemployment makes it more difficult for indebted owners to avoid defaulting on their mortgage. This rise in default, on the order of 20 percent, creates further slack in the housing market by both increasing the number of houses on the market and reducing the amount of buyers. Consequently, there are large drops in housing prices and in the size of mortgage loans. Notably, when firm financial frictions are absent, I observe a counter-factual fall in the unemployment rate, which mitigates the effects on the housing market, and even results in a fall in the mortgage default rate. The results highlight the importance of the impact of the housing market crisis on a firm's willingness to hire, and how firms' limited access to credit magnifies the initial housing shock. In Chapter 3, "Housing Market Distress and Unemployment: A Dynamic Analysis," I add to the contributions of my second paper, and extend the analysis to determine the dynamic effects of the housing crisis on unemployment. In Chapter 2, I focused on comparing stationary equilibria when there is a rise in the foreclosure costs associated with mortgage default. However, a full analysis must also take into account the dynamic effects of the shock. In order to do the dynamic analysis, I modify the model in my job market paper to satisfy the conditions of block recursivity. I do this by incorporating Hedlund's (2016) technique of introducing real estate agents in the housing market that match separately with buyers and sellers. Doing this makes the model's endogenous variables independent of the distribution of households and firms. Rather, the impact of the distribution is summarized by the shadow value of housing. This greatly improves the tractability of the model, and allows me to compute the dynamic response to a fall in a bank's ability to sell a foreclosed house, thus raising the costs of mortgage default. I find that the results are largely dependent on the size and persistence of the shock, as well as the level of firm financial frictions that are present. When firm financial frictions are high, as represented by the presence of an interest rate premium charged to firms, and the initial shock is large, the shock is transferred to firms via an endogenous rise in the cost of renting capital. Firms scale back on production and reduce employment. The rise in unemployment increases the debt burden for households with large mortgages. They can try and sell, but find it difficult to do so because they must sell at a high price to be able to pay off their debt. If they fail, they are forced to default, thus further raising the mortgage costs of banks, further reducing resources to firms, and propagating the initial shock. However, the extent of the propagation is limited; once the shock wears off, the economy recovers to its pre-crisis levels within two quarters. I discuss the reasons why, and what elements would be needed for greater persistence.