Designing Economic Mechanisms

Designing Economic Mechanisms
Author: Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 321
Release: 2006-05-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 113945434X

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A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Author: Tilman Börgers
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Total Pages: 263
Release: 2015
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 019973402X

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This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.

Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design
Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 185
Release: 2011-05-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1139499173

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Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.

Market Design

Market Design
Author: Guillaume Haeringer
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 393
Release: 2018-03-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0262345099

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A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Author: Tilman Borgers
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Total Pages: 263
Release: 2015-01-01
Genre: Game theory
ISBN: 9781336280434

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What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Borgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Borgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs

Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
Total Pages: 471
Release: 2012-03-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9814452165

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Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Author: Tilman Börgers
Publisher:
Total Pages: 263
Release: 2015
Genre: Game theory
ISBN: 9780190244699

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What is the best auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organise themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organised? These questions are the subject of the economic theory of mechanism design. Tilman Börgers' book presents this theory carefully and rigorously. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics will find an exposition of the classic theory of mechanism design, followed by chapters that take the reader to the frontiers of current research in the area.

Communication in Mechanism Design

Communication in Mechanism Design
Author: Steven R. Williams
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 5
Release: 2008-06-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1139471791

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Mechanism design is the field of economics that treats institutions and procedures as variables that can be selected in order to achieve desired objectives. An important aspect of a mechanism is the communication among its participants that it requires, which complements other design features such as incentives and complexity. A calculus-based theory of communication in mechanisms is developed in this book. The value of a calculus-based approach lies in its familiarity as well as the insight into mechanisms that it provides. Results are developed concerning (i) a first order approach to the construction of mechanisms, (ii) the range of mechanisms that can be used to achieve a given objective, as well as (iii) lower bounds on the required communication.